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S U M M A R Y
Despite much progress in surveillance and biological research, no explanation exists to date for the
epidemic pattern ofmeningitis in the Africanmeningitis belt, which is required tomathematicallymodel
the impact of vaccine strategies or to predict epidemics. This paper presents a hypothetical explanatory
model for epidemic meningococcal meningitis. Four incidence patterns are deﬁned as model states,
including endemic incidence during the rainy season, ubiquitous hyperendemicity during the dry
season, occasional localized epidemics, and–at the regional level–regular epidemic waves spanning over
communities or years. While the transition from endemic to hyperendemic situation in a community is
caused by an increase in risk of meningitis given colonization by a virulent meningococcus (due to
damage of the pharyngeal mucosa by dry climate), the transition from hyperendemic to epidemic
situation involves increased pharyngeal colonization and transmission (possibly caused by viral
respiratory infection epidemics). The described mechanisms are sufﬁcient to explain the 10- to 100-fold
incidence increase that both transitions usually imply. Epidemic waves occur if new meningococcal
strains which escape pre-existing immunity, enter the population. Future research should include the
impact of viral co-infection on bacterial colonization and invasion.
 2009 International Society for Infectious Diseases. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Epidemic meningococcal disease in sub-Saharan Africa proba-
bly occurred ﬁrst in the late 19th century.1 A few decades later,
Lapeyssonnie described the particular epidemiological pattern of
meningococcal meningitis in an area spanning fromMali to Sudan,
which he named the ‘meningitis belt’.2 He described an ‘endemo-
sporadic’ incidence beyond that observed on other continents,
with ‘seasonal re-enforcement’ and regular epidemic waves.
Further particularities of meningococcal disease in the meningitis
belt, which today is deﬁned by a larger area, spanning from Senegal
to Ethiopia,3 include a preponderance for meningitis as the
primary clinical syndrome rather than septicemia4 (although
surveillance may underestimate the latter due to poor access to
health care), and the predominance of serogroup A over other
serogroups for sporadic and epidemic disease.5,6
The recent development of a serogroup A conjugate meningo-
coccal vaccine speciﬁcally for preventive use in African countries
(Meningitis Vaccine Project, www.meningvax.org) promises a
substantial decrease in meningococcal serogroup A epidemic§ This work was presented as a poster at the 7th Louis Pasteur Conference, Paris,
France, November 11–13, 2008.
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doi:10.1016/j.ijid.2009.08.013disease over the coming decade. Mathematical models will be
useful to evaluate different vaccination scheduleswith this vaccine
with regard to their impact, similar to research conducted around
the group C conjugate vaccine in the UK.7 These transmission
dynamic models, however, require assumptions about the
meningococcal transmission pattern in relation to seasons and
epidemics, which have not yet been identiﬁed. In addition, because
serogroups other than group A also have epidemic potential,
attempts are being made to mathematically predict epidemics
based on meteorological data.8–11 These projects usually model
district-level epidemic data as a function of variables such as
rainfall, wind speed, dust load, and air humidity. Finally,
understanding the mechanisms that lead to the unique epidemio-
logical patterns would also be of interest for prevention and
control of other infectious diseases with epidemic potential.
Several years ago, Moore12 and Grifﬁss13 proposed explanatory
models for epidemic meningitis. However, neither model allows
combining the relevant factors (strain biology, immunity, and
climate/environment) to explain the observed disease incidence
and carriage patterns. This paper presents a hypothetical
explanatory model for the epidemiology of meningococcal
meningitis in the African meningitis belt, which may guide further
research and the development of mathematical models and
preventive interventions. We review herein the typical incidence
and carriage patterns before assembling them into a hypothetical
model.ses. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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The following description of incidence patterns is based on a
variety of data sources, including: (1) national routine surveillance
data for the last decade available from the ministries of health in
Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, which represent weekly or annual
numbers of suspected meningitis cases per district or country as
reported by health care agents; (2) routine surveillance data for the
last ﬁve years, which were obtained from selected sanitary district
authorities in western Burkina Faso and Mali and which represent
weekly numbers of suspectedmeningitis cases per health center as
reported by health care agents; (3) published data on etiology- and
age-speciﬁc incidence rates over time from surveillance studies at
study sites (one or several districts) in Burkina Faso, Niger and
northern Ghana.
Endemic period
During the rainy season, approximately June throughNovember,
the incidence ofmeningococcal disease in themeningitis belt is low,
with weekly incidence rates in most districts of 0–0.5 per 100 000Figure 1. Example of weekly incidence rates (per 100 000, 4-week moving average) of n
districts Secteur 15 (400 000 inhabitants) and Hounde´ (250 000 inhabitants) in wester
Burkina Faso. (a) Scale of y-axis up to 5 per 100 000; hatched line, relative air humid
hyperendemic incidences of about 1 per 100 000 during all years. (b) Scale of y-axis up to
(here during 1996, 2002, and 2006).(data: ministries of health, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger). Figure 1a
illustrates this using the example of three sanitary districts in
westernBurkina Fasoduring1997–2008. This ‘endemic’ incidence is
comparable to that observed in Europe.14 For example, in France,
annual incidence rates of meningococcal disease (all serogroups
combined, 77% asmeningeal syndrome) vary between<1 and 5 per
100 000 across regions and years. This corresponds to an average
weekly incidence rate of<0.001 to 0.1 per 100 000, where the peak
in late winter implies a doubling of incidence compared to the
lowest incidences during the summer and autumn.15–17 Incidence
estimates from Africa may be biased in one direction by limited
access to health care and in the other by case deﬁnitions based on
clinical syndromes rather than laboratory conﬁrmation (which also
means that a substantial part of the non-epidemic morbidity is due
to pneumococcus, not only meningococcus18). Taken together,
endemic meningococcal disease incidence during the rainy season
in the meningitis belt seems to be roughly comparable to that
observed in Europe and other continents.
By contrast, during the dry season, three features distinguish its
pattern: hyperendemicity, localized epidemics, and epidemic
waves.otiﬁed suspected meningitis cases and air humidity in the meningitis belt. Sanitary
n Burkina Faso, 1997–2008. Data: Direction Re´gionale de Sante´ des Hauts-Bassins,
ity measured at the Bobo-Dioulasso airport during 2006. All districts experience
80 per 100 000. Epidemics were declared at the district level only during some years
Figure 2. Annual total number of reported suspected meningitis cases, Burkina
Faso, 1940–2008. Data: Ministry of Health, Burkina Faso.
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During each dry season, most districts in the meningitis belt
experience an increase in meningitis incidence, a period usually
described as meningitis season (data: ministries of health, Burkina
Faso,Mali andNiger). During this hyperendemic situation, which is
only observed during the dry season, district level weekly
incidence rates (of reported suspected cases) usually rise to 1
per 100 000 and well above, as illustrated in Figure 1a. For
example, in Burkina Faso during January through May 2008, 96%
and 79%, respectively, of the 63 sanitary districts reported aweekly
incidence rate above 1 or 2 during at least 4 weeks, and 89% and
63%, respectively, reported a rate above 1 or 2 during at least 8
weeks (data: Ministry of Health, Burkina Faso). This hyperendemic
increase is also seen in laboratory-conﬁrmed meningococcal
cases.6,19–22 As shown by bacterial meningitis surveillance studies
in northern Ghana and Burkina Faso, pneumococcal meningitis
incidence in the meningitis belt also increases during the dry
season and therefore contributes to a certain extent to this
hyperendemic meningitis situation during the dry season.18,22
Overall, compared to the endemic situation, meningococcal
meningitis incidence during the hyperendemic period seems to
be multiplied by a factor of about 10–100.
Localized epidemics
Exclusively during the dry season and in addition to hyperen-
demic incidence, epidemics may occur in some communities of the
meningitis belt in given years (Figure 1b). On the district level,
weekly incidence rates of10 per 100 000 are considered epidemic.
In Burkina Faso during January through May 2008, 27% of districts
showedsuchweekly incidence ratesof10duringat leastoneweek.
Although useful for planning of reactive vaccination, district level
incidence rates likely hide the true force and localization of
epidemics, and theweekly incidence threshold of 10 fordistinguish-
ing hyperendemic from epidemic situations may be too low at the
community-level. Typically, if entire sanitary districts are in an
epidemic situation as deﬁned, the majority of health centers report
weekly incidence rates below 20, while rates of 20–100 and 100
are observed in only a few health centers and only during a few
weeks. Furthermore, incidence rates seem to increase suddenly
within twoor threeweeks. Thispatterncanconsistentlybeobserved
over the years in health center-level national surveillance data of
meningitis belt countries, while the number and extent of such
localized epidemics in a given region vary over the years (data:
ministries of health, Burkina Faso and Mali). In addition, among the
population served by a given health center, only a few villages may
experience the epidemic, as shown by several reports of such highly
localized epidemics.23–25 Two surveillance studies conducted
during localized epidemics in Burkina Faso reported a peak weekly
incidence rate of 247 per 100 000 for conﬁrmed meningococcal
meningitis cases23 and a peak attack proportion (for the total
duration of the epidemic) of suspected cases of 2.8%.25 However, to
date, there is no formal threshold deﬁnition of localized epidemics
on the community level, which would require a large-scale
systematic analysis of health center-level data in the meningitis
belt. A weekly incidence rate of 50 or 100 per 100 000 may be
considered a preliminary threshold deﬁnition.
In conclusion, if hyperendemic disease incidence found in most
communities during the meningitis season was deﬁned as weekly
incidence rates of 1–20 per 100 000 on the community level, and
weekly incidence rates during localized epidemics range from 50 to
1000per 100000, it canbeestimated that incidenceduring localized
epidemics compared to hyperendemic incidence is multiplied by a
factor of about 10–100, and this over several weeks. This epidemic
increase in incidence ismost likely unique formeningococcus, as nosuch localized meningitis epidemics, only seasonal hyperendemi-
city, have been reported for other common bacterial meningitis
agents involving all age groups, such as pneumococcus.20,22
Epidemic waves
If the communities of a given country had an independent and
constant risk of localized epidemics, the total annual number of
notiﬁed meningitis cases in the country should be fairly constant.
However, this number is subject to great yearly variation, as shown
in several meningitis belt countries.19,26 For example, among the
approximately 15 million inhabitants of Burkina Faso, a minimum
of 1000–5000 cases has been reported each year since 1940, but
spikes of 10 000–30 000 annual cases occur approximately every 7
to 10 years (Figure 2). Improvements in surveillance have occurred
over the last decade; however, this pattern has remained. In a given
decade, annual case counts during epidemic waves appear to be 3-
to 10-fold higher than outside epidemic waves. Even during
epidemic waves that last for several years (e.g., the 2001–3 and
2006–8 waves in Burkina Faso), meningitis incidence always
returns to endemic levels during the rainy and early dry season
(data: ministries of health, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger). These
major incidence variations are most likely unique for meningo-
coccus, although minor annual variations may exist for pneumo-
coccus.22
The carriage pattern
While invasion and invasive disease can probably occur after a
short period of adhesion of the meningococci to the pharyngeal
mucosal epithelium, meningococci can also form persistent
colonies on the mucosal surface. Whether adhesion leads to
colonization, or whether adhesion or colonization lead to invasion,
depends on the host’s mucosal and systemic immune status,27
bacterial factors,28 and probably the integrity of the mucosa.29
Prevalence
According to a recent systematic review, there does not seem to
be a systematic variation in the carriage prevalence of virulent
meningococcal strains (serogroups A, W135, X, Y) by season in the
meningitis belt.30 Rather, long-term variations in meningococcal
ecology, including clonal waves of colonization, occur over time.31
Inmost studies done during the endemic or hyperendemic periods,
virulent strains are carried at a relatively low prevalence of
between <1% and 5%.30–38 By contrast, in populations that were
experiencing an epidemic at the time of evaluation, carriage
prevalence of the outbreak strain (at least for serogroups A and
W135) was found to be high at 10–30% in most instances, while
Table 1
Estimates of risk of serogroup A meningococcal meningitis given serogroup A colonization, across endemic, hyperendemic, and epidemic situations. Data: KKD district,
northern Ghana as published in Leimkugel et al.,31 and Bobo-Dioulasso region, western Burkina Faso20,23,32
Epidemiologic
situation
Month Risk as
publisheda
Peak weekly
incidence
(per 100 000)b
Carriage
prevalence
(per 100)c
Risk calculated
as weekly cases/
carriers (100)
Increase in risk between
situations (-fold)
KKD district Endemic to hyperendemic
situation:
Hyperendemic April 2002 42.3 7.17 3 0.238 67 (followingd)
Endemic November 2002 1.1 0.18 5 0.004
Hyperendemic April 2003 0.4 4.46 6 0.074 21 (precedingd)
13 (followingd)
Endemic November 2003 18.7 0.18 3 0.006
Hyperendemic
or epidemic
April 2004 16.8 7.14 11 0.065 11 (precedingd)
7 (followingd)
Endemic November 2004 1.5 0.18 2 0.009
Bobo-Dioulasso region Hyperendemic to
epidemic situation:
Hyperendemic March 2003 – 0.44 0.01–0.10e 0.4–4.4
Epidemic March 2006 – 250 16 1.6 0.36–3.56
a Calculated as total of conﬁrmed cases during the surrounding 6-month period/1000 carriers.33
b Laboratory-conﬁrmed meningococcal serogroup A cases; incidence rates for KKD were estimated from graphs shown in Leimkugel et al.31
c Carriage prevalences for KKD were estimated from graphs shown in Leimkugel et al.31
d Hyperendemic compared to the preceding or following endemic period.
e Assumption, as no Neisseria meningitidis serogroup A carriers were found among 488 participants at ﬁve repeat exams during February through June,40 consistent with
other studies.25,33,34
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prevalence between<1% (serogroups A, W135) and 6% (serogroup
Y).23,25,33 In conclusion, it can be estimated that carriage
prevalence of a virulent strain varies between the non-epidemic
and epidemic situation by a factor of 10 or higher.
Risk of invasive disease (meningitis) given colonization
The risk of invasive disease following meningococcal coloniza-
tion can be approximated by calculating the ratio of the number of
disease cases over the number of carriers during a certain period, or
of disease incidence over carriage prevalence at a given time point.
Unfortunately, little evidence exists on changes of this parameter
by season or epidemic situation. However, a series of carriage
surveys combined with exhaustive meningitis surveillance in
northern Ghana allowed calculating the disease-to-carrier ratio
speciﬁcally for serogroup A over several rainy and dry seasons.31
Across study years, this ratio was reported as 0.4–1.5 during the
rainy season and 17–42 during the dry season, suggesting that risk
of meningitis given colonization changed by a factor of 7 to 67
between the endemic and the hyperendemic period (Table 1). In
the Bobo-Dioulasso area of western Burkina Faso, carriage studies
and exhaustive meningitis surveillance were conducted during the
hyperendemic period in 2003 and during a serogroup A epidemic
in 2006.20,23,32 The disease-to-carrier ratio estimated from these
data was 1.6 in the epidemic situation and 0.4–4.4 (depending on
assumptions) during the hyperendemic period, suggesting that the
risk of meningitis given colonization changed by a factor of at
maximum 4 between hyperendemic and epidemic situations
(Table 1). In conclusion, the risk of meningitis given colonization
with a virulent meningococcus seems to increase from the
endemic to hyperendemic period by a factor of 10–100, while it
remains relatively constant between the hyperendemic and
epidemic situation.
The model
Model structure
In our hypothetical model (Figure 3), the endemic, hyperen-
demic and localized epidemic situations are considered as a seriesof three states at the community level, which can change, only in
this order, from one to another. The term community has broad
application here and can refer to a rural village or urban
neighborhood of 1000 inhabitants, or a dense urban population
of 100 000 inhabitants. At the regional level, two states are deﬁned:
during a given year or meningitis season, regional disease
incidence can be ‘regular’ with some localized epidemics occurring
among the communities, or part of an epidemic wave, if more
localized epidemics than usual occur in the region or country or
they occur with a higher attack ratio. Region is considered a larger
group of communities, e.g., all villages and towns of Burkina Faso.
The transition from one state to the other implies a multiplication
of the meningococcal meningitis incidence rate in the community
or the region. Each state is associated with a speciﬁc order of
magnitude of carriage prevalence and risk of meningitis given
colonization. Speciﬁcally, the transition from endemic to hyper-
endemic situation (10- to 100-fold) is associated with a change
from low to high risk of meningitis given colonization (10- to 100-
fold); and the transition from hyperendemic to epidemic situation
(10- to 100-fold) with an increase from low carriage prevalence to
high prevalence (10-fold or higher). Because changes in incidence
are of the same order of magnitude as the respective changes in
carriage prevalence or risk of invasion, the latter may be sufﬁcient
to cause the increase in incidence. In consequence, hyperendemic
incidence during the dry season could be explained by a greater
risk of invasion by colonizing meningococci, while the occurrence
of a localized epidemic during the dry season could largely be
explained by a transient increase in meningococcal transmission
and colonization. The latter implies that a surge in carriage
prevalence, not a speciﬁc carriage prevalence level per se, is
associated with epidemic risk.
Factors causing transitions
Climate likely plays the decisive role for the changes in risk of
invasion given colonization between endemic and hyperendemic
periods. The association between various meteorological para-
meters, including low air humidity, wind speed, and dust load, and
seasonal variations in meningitis incidence, has been well
documented.9–11 However, these climatic factors as measured
during the dry season do not vary substantially between years or
Figure 3. Hypothetical explanatory model for meningococcal meningitis in the African meningitis belt.
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unlikely to be responsible for the occurrence of localized
epidemics, and their role may be limited to the hyperendemic
increase during the dry season.9 Hyperendemicity is more
pronounced during the second half of the dry season (Figure 1).
This suggests that some accumulation of noxious effect may be
responsible. For example, extremely low air humidity or high dust
load that persists over many weeks may increasingly damage the
pharyngeal mucosa, to the point where colonizing meningococci
are more likely to invade the epithelium.1 In the model presented,
this mechanism does not imply any change in the frequency of
meningococcal transmission or colonization, but rather that
transmitted meningococci of any serogroup can cause disease
more frequently during hyperendemic than endemic periods. This
is consistent with the regular ﬁnding of sporadic cases of various
serogroups (A, W135, X, Y, and previously C) during the meningitis
season.21,31,39 Meningococcal strains that are transmitted but
rarely colonize, such as serogroup A,34,40 may, however, carry an
accrued risk for disease if less efﬁcient natural immunity exists in
the host in the absence of regular colonization.
In the previous paragraph, we hypothesized that the transition
from hyperendemic to epidemic disease requires an increase in
carriage prevalence, and thus in frequency of individual coloniza-
tion. Little is known about factors that can facilitate strain-speciﬁc
meningococcal colonization within a short time. A hypothesis that
is compatible with the highly localized and sporadic occurrence of
meningococcal epidemics is that some infectious agents act as co-
factors. Some studies during meningitis epidemics have found an
association between outbreak strain carriage and current or
previous respiratory pathogen infection or symptoms.23,33,41,42
Viral pharyngeal infections are known to promote transmission
and adhesion of bacteria to the pharyngeal mucosa or respiratory
epitheliumby coughing and sneezing, or by changes of themucosa,
of bacterial surface structure or of the immune response in the
host.43–48 If current or preceding respiratory infections favor
meningococcal colonization and transmission on the individuallevel, respiratory infection epidemics could lead to a surge in
carriage prevalence in the population. Other serogroups than A,
such as W135, exhibit the same pattern of carriage surge and
association with respiratory infection.33 Serogroup A, though, may
be particularly ﬁt at substantially increasing colonization during
pharyngeal viral infection. In addition, reduced immune defense
during or after viral infections may contribute to an increased risk
of invasive disease given colonization. Micro-epidemics of enteric
pathogens, as proposed by Grifﬁss,13 may play a similar role, but
are less apt to explain the observed surge in pharyngeal carriage. In
speciﬁc situations, sudden crowding and population movement
may play a role, such as in refugee ormilitary camps.49 Such factors
are usually not observed in localized epidemics occurring in rural
populations during the dry season and thus are not obligatory
factors, but they may contribute to the risk of micro-epidemics of
co-infections.
Epidemic waves on the regional level may be due to a
combination of two events. First, wider geographic spread of the
discussed epidemic co-factors, for example a viral epidemic, may
occur during these years than usual. More importantly, changes in
meningococcal strain biology most likely play a role, such as the
arrival and propagation of new strains that escape pre-existing
immunity or feature higher virulence or transmissibility.28 Such
emergence has been repeatedly described, most recently with
W135:2a:1.5,2 of sequence type (ST) 11 and serogroup A of ST-5,
ST-7 and ST-2859.50,51 Co-factor epidemics or changes in strain
biology by itself cannot cause epidemic waves, as incidence always
returns to endemic levels during the rainy season, and new strains
may be found in endemic or hyperendemic disease while it is
involved in an epidemic wave elsewhere.
Discussion
The presented model is novel in that it combines previously
discussed factors such as climate, viral infections, and strain
biology12,13 with observed meningococcal incidence and carriage
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disease with seasonal increase and epidemic waves,2 but adds the
feature of localized epidemics as an obligatory element that is
caused by different and speciﬁc mechanisms. Additional factors
known to contribute to the disease pattern, such as crowding in
refugee camps (increase in transmission) or waning pre-existing
immunity in the population (increased risk of invasion given
carriage), can be integrated in speciﬁc steps of the model.
The explanatory model has several applications. First, is may
help our understanding of speciﬁc observations or events, for
example, the emergence of serogroupW135 in Burkina Faso during
2001–2003.21 During the dry season of 2002, all districts observed
at least hyperendemic meningitis, and about half reported
epidemics.52 According to the presented model, the occurrence
of epidemics in speciﬁc districts or communities did not depend on
the arrival of a new strain, but on the discussed co-factors that
precipitate epidemics. The extension from some localized epi-
demics to an epidemic wave, however, was probably associated
with the (re–)introduction and circulation of a highly virulent
strain variant (W135:2a:1.5,2 of ST-11)53 that escaped pre-existing
immunity and that possibly was capable of quickly increasing
colonization under certain conditions.
A second application of this explanatory model is in
mathematical modeling. Our model suggests that attempts to
predict epidemics based solely on meteorological and district-
level data are not likely to succeed. After validation with
surveillance data, mathematical models that aim to evaluate
vaccine impact on meningitis incidence may need to take into
account vaccine impact on transition probabilities between the
four incidence states we described (endemic, hyperendemic,
epidemic, epidemicwave). Themodel also suggests that the direct
vaccine effects will protect against both hyperendemic and
epidemic disease, while the indirect effect of conjugate vaccines,
which prevent transmission, will play a particular role against
epidemic disease.
Lastly, this explanatory model suggests that in the absence of
preventive vaccine strategies against serogroups like X orW135 in
meningitis belt countries, it may be possible to reduce the burden
of disease using interventions that limit the harmful link between
climatic conditions during the dry season and the seasonal increase
of disease (e.g., by indoor air humidiﬁcation) and between
epidemic co-factors and localized epidemics (e.g., inﬂuenza
vaccines, if inﬂuenza was found to be a co-factor).
This hypothetical model requires validation in various settings
and areas of themeningitis belt. Health center-level incidence data
should be systematically evaluated over expanded periods and
regions. Further evidence on the serogroup-speciﬁc variation of
case-to-carrier ratio and carriage prevalence over seasons and
epidemiological situations is needed, especially fromMali, Burkina
Faso and Niger, which are the core countries of the meningitis belt.
Although difﬁcult to perform, ecological comparison studies of
communities in epidemic versus hyperendemic situations will be
useful to evaluate the role of viral epidemics and other epidemic
co-factors. Knowledge about seasonality of viral respiratory and
systemic infections in the meningitis belt and their impact on
serogroup-speciﬁc meningococcal colonization, transmission and
invasion should be improved. Finally, exhaustive population-based
surveillance that yields information on incidence rates and
serogroup and genotype distribution is an essential background
for this research agenda.
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